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	 A 	
	
This	 paper	 studies	 the	 relation	 between	 Islam	 and	 economic	 development	 from	 a	
juridico-philosophical	perspective.	A	fresh	review	of	this	issue	is	timely	because	of	the	
ongoing	 laggardness	of	Arab	and	Muslim	economies	due	 to	decades	of	Pareto-inferior	
poverty	 traps.	 We	 disentangle	 the	 viewpoints	 on	 the	 Islamic-economic	 nexus	 and	
determine	that	the	backwardness	of	Muslim	countries’	economies	is	due	to	the	retrograde	
outlook	of	the	jurists	(fuqahāʾ).	Flawed	jurisprudential	reasoning	is	instrumental	in	the	
paucity	 of	 financial	 instruments,	 markets,	 and	 institutional	 development.	 We	 also	
scrutinise	the	jurists’	co-option	by	the	ruling	elite,	which	legitimises	the	elite’s	autocracy.	
We	 conclude	 by	 recommending	 a	 salient	 strategy	 critical	 to	 fostering	 economic	
development	and	growth.	
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1	 	
	
The	 Muslim	 world	 trails	 the	West	 in	 job	 creation,	 education,	 technology,	 and	
productivity;	however,	many	of	the	economic	troubles	of	the	Arab	world	are	still	
blamed	on	globalization	and	Western	economic	domination.1	
 
The	ongoing	civil	upheaval	in	several	of	the	Islamic	states	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	
Africa	 (MENA)	 highlights	 the	 frustration	 of	 the	 masses	 at	 decades,	 possibly	 even	
centuries,	 of	 economic,	 political,	 and	 social	 underdevelopment.	 This	
underdevelopment	 is	 not	 peculiar	 to	 these	 Arab	 states;	 it	 reverberates	 generally	
around	the	Muslim	world.	Given	the	relative	economic	superiority	of	the	Muslim	world	
over	Europe	for	much	of	the	pre-modern	age,	the	ongoing	uprisings	bring	to	the	fore	
                                               
* Acknowledgements:	We	are	grateful	to	Habib	Ahmed,	Sitara	Akram,	Mabid	Al-Jarhi,	Sami	Al-Suwailem,	
Mahmoud	 El-Gamal,	Mohammad	Hashim	 Kamali,	 Timur	 Kuran,	 Ishtiaq	 Pasha	Mahmood,	 Jonathan	
Moore,	Mohammad	Nejatullah	Siddiqi,	Arshad	Zaman,	and	participants	of	many	conferences	for	their	
thoughtful	comments.	
1		 T.	Waywell,	 ‘A	failure	to	modernize:	The	origins	of	20th.	century	Islamic	fundamentalism’,	Concord	
Review	16	(2006):	159-190.	
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the	 criticality	 of	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 Islam	 for	 improving	 economic	
development.	 Specifically,	 in	 this	 paper,	 we	 discuss	 the	 internal	 and	 external	
institutional	factors	that	have	impeded	the	progress	of	the	Muslim	world	and	present	
an	institutional	strategy	to	recover	some	degree	of	economic	parity	with	the	so-called	
developed	world.	
Our	study	scrutinises	the	historical	stasis	of	institutions	in	the	Muslim	world	from	a	
juridico-philosophical	 perspective.	 The	 literature	 widely	 accepts	 the	 crucial	 role	 that	
institutions	have	historically	played	 in	economic	development.2	Institutional	 evolution	
(or	stagnation)	over	time	can	explain	how	businesses	flourish	(or	wither	away)	due	to	
decreasing	 (or	 increasing)	 transaction	 costs.	 This	 evolution	 can	 favourably	 (or	
unfavourably)	affect	society.	Here	we	elaborate	on	how	religious	beliefs	are	contingent	
on	 how	 scholars	 (culamāʾ)	 interpret	 the	 scriptures	 of	 the	 Qurʾan	 and	 Sunna	 –	 the	
normative	 practices	 of	 the	 prophet	 Muhammad.	 Particularly	 influential	 amongst	 this	
group	are	the	jurists	(fuqahāʾ),	whose	task	is	to	derive	religious	law	(ijtihād)	from	the	
sacred	sources.3	Consistent	with	Keeley,	the	pursuit	of	this	line	of	enquiry	can	establish	
the	link	between	development	and	juridical	rulings.4	Valuable	policy	recommendations	
to	boost	economic	growth	and	development	can	also	be	derived	from	such	an	enquiry.	
Our	efforts	yield	the	following	observations.	First,	we	identify	the	Pareto-inferior	
poverty	traps	of	the	Muslim	states	to	the	hysteresis	that	is	fundamentally	linked	to	the	
retrospective	outlook	of	the	jurists	and	their	inability	to	undertake	adequate	and	robust	
jurisprudential	reasoning	(ijtihād).	We	document	this	by	illustrating	the	shortcomings	of	
the	jurists’	rationale,	focusing	on	a	crucial	injunction	in	Islam	pertaining	to	the	protection	
of	property	rights	(ribā),	which	the	jurists	have	misunderstood.5	This	misunderstanding	
has	 led	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 establish	 institutions	 that	 protect	 these	 rights	 and	 so	 advance	
financial	 development. 6 ,	 7 	Historically,	 this	 misunderstanding	 has	 also	 led	 jurists	 to	
condone,	 and	 at	 times	 even	 to	 legitimise,	 the	 rent-seeking	 practices	 of	monarchs	 and	
                                               
2		 D.	Acemoglu,	S.	Johnson	&	J.A.	Robinson,	‘Institutions	as	a	fundamental	cause	of	long-run	growth’,	in	P.	
Aghion	&	S.N.	Durlauf	(eds.),	Handbook	of	Economic	Growth	(Amsterdam:	Elsevier,	2005),	1:385-472.		
3		 Our	reference	to	the	jurists	is	based	primarily	on	the	literature	developed	by	them	over	the	course	of	
Islamic	history.	This	 literature	has	been	at	times	updated	by	the	legal	opinions	of	muftīs	(scholars	
whose	role	it	is	to	issue	opinions	and	verdicts).	However,	in	the	main,	the	literature	has	been	compiled	
by	 author-jurists	 (i.e.,	 scholars	 whose	 activity	 involved	 writing	 legal	 treatises	 and	 expanded	
commentaries).	After	the	crystallisation	of	Islamic	law	into	the	major	schools	of	thought,	it	is	almost	
impossible	 to	 find	 legal	opinions	 in	 the	 law	pertaining	 to	 financial	 transactions	diverging	 from	the	
views	expressed	 in	 the	 literature	of	 the	classical	age.	This	 is	why	our	generalised	reference	 to	 the	
jurists,	treating	them	as	a	monolithic	group,	is	in	our	opinion	justified.	For	more	on	the	legal	specialists,	
see	W.	Hallaq,	Introduction	to	Islamic	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009).	
4		 L.	 Keely,	 ‘Comment	 on:	 People’s	 opium?	 Religion	 and	 economic	 attitudes’,	 Journal	 of	 Monetary	
Economics	50(1)	(2003):	283-287.		
5		 See	M.S.	Ebrahim,	A.	Jaafar,	P.	Molyneux,	&	M.O.	Salleh,	Agency	Costs,	Financial	Contracting	and	the	
Muslim	World,	Working	Paper,	Durham	University	Business	School,	Durham	University,	2016.	
6		 Pryor	reiterates	this	when	he	terms	ribā	an	‘obscure	Arabic	word,	which	most	Muslim	scholars	have	
interpreted	as	‘interest’	but	which	some	consider	it	as	“usury”’.	Since	key	economic	issues	have	not	
been	interpreted	precisely,	it	is	unsurprising	that	Pryor	fails	to	find	any	Muslim	economic	system	with	
a	unique	Islamic	identity.	F.L.	Pryor,	‘The	economic	impact	of	Islam	on	developing	countries’,	World	
Development	35(11)	(2007):	1818.	
7		 L.	Angeles,	‘Institutions,	property	rights,	and	economic	development	in	historical	perspective’,	Kyklos	
64	(2011):	157-177.	
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autocrats.8	This	hysteresis	reconciles	the	opposing	theories	in	the	literature	on	Islamic	
economic	development,	whilst	at	the	same	time	positing	that	Islam,	the	religion,	has	not	
impeded	the	advancement	of	the	Muslim	world.9,	10	
Our	second	observation	is	that	for	regions	of	the	Muslim	world	to	advance,	there	
needs	to	be	greater	refinement	in	the	manner	in	which	jurisprudential	reasoning	(ijtihād)	
is	 conducted.	 An	 overhaul	 of	 educational	 institutions,	 which	 currently	 serve	 only	 to	
perpetuate	intellectual	stagnation,	could	facilitate	this	refinement.	This	overhaul	needs	to	
be	followed	by	the	structuring	of	institutions	to	promote	property	rights	and	to	encourage	
good	governance.	Further,	 it	should	 include	a	 financial	architecture	aligned	with	Islam	
that	promotes	growth.	
This	paper	is	organised	as	follows.	Section	2	discusses	the	institutional	background	
of	 the	Muslim	world.	Section	3	reviews	the	 literature	on	the	economic	performance	of	
Muslim	countries.	Section	4	provides	a	diagnosis	of	what	has	gone	awry	with	the	Muslim	
world	from	an	Islamic	legal	perspective.	Section	5	concludes	with	a	strategy	for	stemming	
the	tide	of	economic	malaise	and	reviving	growth.	
	
2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Despite	 representing	 approximately	 21	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 world’s	 population,	 Muslim	
countries	lag	far	behind	other	nations	in	terms	of	development,	contributing	a	mere	8	per	
cent	 of	 the	 world’s	 Gross	 National	 Product	 (GNP).	 This	 reiterates	 the	 poor	 results	
reported	 in	 the	Human	Development	 Index	 (HDI):11	of	 the	57	Muslim	countries	 in	 the	
HDI,	21	received	low	scores,	31	secured	medium	scores,	and	only	5	attained	high	scores.12	
Recent	research	on	the	relation	between	political	economy	and	underdevelopment	
in	the	Muslim	world,	such	as	by	Haber,	attributes	underdevelopment	in	the	Muslim	world	
to	 the	 ‘democratic	 deficit’,	 which	 it	 argues	 is	 linked	 to	 desert	 institutions. 13 	Haber	
maintains	that	moderate	rainfalls	engender	agriculture,	thereby	promoting	urbanisation,	
trade,	and	state-building.	 In	contrast,	arid	 land	undermines	the	evolution	of	a	modern	
state,	which	is	an	essential	condition	for	democratisation.	Malik	and	Awadallah	identify	
the	cause	of	the	Middle	East’s	long-term	failure	as	being	a	flawed	model	of	development	
that	hinges	on	 inefficient	 forms	of	intervention	and	redistribution	and	that	 is	 financed	
through	 external	windfalls.14	Chaney	 attributes	 the	 lack	 of	 democracy	 in	 parts	 of	 the	
                                               
8		 See	also	Pryor,	supra	note	6	at	1815-1835;	M.Coşgel,	T.	Miceli	&	R.	Ahmed,	 ‘Law,	 state	power	and	
taxation	 in	 Islamic	 history’,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 Behavior	 and	 Organization	 71	 (2009):	 704-717;	
Angeles,	supra	note	7.		
9		 Pryor,	supra	note	6	at	1815-1835.	
10		 Weede	is	of	the	view	that	two	unimplemented	features	of	the	Islamic	religion	make	the	Muslim	society	
more	conducive	 to	capitalism,	 thus	 inducing	growth.	One	 is	 that	 the	 religion	encourages	economic	
ventures,	 as	 Prophet	 Muhammad	 himself	 was	 a	 merchant.	 Second,	 religious	 constraints	 curb	
unjustified	taxes	and	deficit	increases.	E.	Weede,	‘Long-run	economic	performance	in	the	European	
periphery:	Russia	and	Turkey’,	Kyklos	64	(2011):	138-156.	
11		 Published	by	the	United	Nations	Development	Program	(UNDP),	the	HDI	incorporates	three	variables:	
life	 expectancy	 at	 birth,	 educational	 attainment	 and	 effort,	 and	 per	 capita	 income.	 See	 http:	
//hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/.	
12		 See	also,	Pryor,	supra	note	6	at	1815-1835;	M.U.	Chapra,	‘Ibn	Khaldun’s	theory	of	development:	Does	
it	help	explain	the	low	performance	of	the	present-day	Muslim	world?’,	Journal	of	Socio-Economics	37	
(2008):	836-863.	
13		 S.	Haber,	Rainfall	and	Democracy:	Climate,	Technology,	and	the	Evolution	of	Economic	and	Political	
Institutions,	Working	Paper,	Department	of	Economics,	Stanford	University,	2012.	
14		 A.	Malik	&	B.	Awadallah,	‘The	economics	of	the	Arab	Spring’,	World	Development	45	(2013):	296-313.	
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Muslim	world	 to	 its	 conquest	 by	 the	 Arab	 armies	 following	 the	 death	 of	 the	 Prophet	
Muhammad.15	This	 impacted	 the	 conquered	 societies	 for	 centuries,	 eventually	 turning	
them	into	autocratic	states.16,	17	
According	 to	 several	 studies	 (described	 below),	 the	 underdevelopment	 of	 the	
Muslim	world	is	not	a	recent	phenomenon;	rather,	it	stretches	back	as	far	as	the	Middle	
Ages.	Also,	scholars	have	attributed	it	to	a	variety	of	internal	systemic	problems,	linked	
to	 religion,	 society,	 and	politics,	 rather	 than	 to	Western	 imperialism	or	other	external	
factors.	One	such	theory,	proffered	by	Timur	Kuran,	contends	that	 the	Muslim	world’s	
degeneration	is	due	to	its	failure	to	develop	robust	civil	institutions	that	could	both	serve	
as	a	check	on	the	power	of	the	ruling	classes	and	facilitate	economic	growth.18	Kuran	finds	
that	Islamic	law	is	a	major	impediment	to	economic	development	in	the	region.	The	thrust	
of	 Kuran’s	 thesis	 is	 that	 a	 developed	 financial	 system	 contributes	 significantly	 to	 a	
nation’s	growth.	We	agree	with	Kuran	that	financial	systems	play	a	vital	role	in	advancing	
intermediation	by	mitigating	market	frictions,	facilitating	efficient	investment	decisions,	
allocating	 scarce	 capital,	 and	 transmitting	 financial	 transactions.	 This	 role	 in	 turn	
stimulates	 decisions	 on	 capital	 accumulation	 and	 innovations	 that	 are	 crucial	 to	
delineating	a	nation’s	long-term	economic	path.19	
Innovation	is	a	crucial	energising	force	in	economic	growth.	Arguably	the	Muslim	
world	has	been	economically	emasculated	of	this	element	due	to	the	constraining	force	
of	 orthodoxy.	 Certainly,	 a	 body	 of	 evidence	 shows	 that	 religious	 constraints,	 amongst	
other	 factors,	 form	 the	 backdrop	 of	 inertia	 in	 commercial	organisations.	 Shatzmiller’s	
study	 is	 representative	 of	 this	 theme.	 The	 study	 contrasts	 the	 concentration	 of	
occupations	stemming	from	commerce	(private	commercial	enterprises)	with	that	of	the	
bureaucracy	 and	 the	 military	 (executive)	 and	 the	 education	 and	 legal	 (including	
religious)	 sectors	 in	Arab-Islamic	 regions	 during	 two	 consecutive	 eras:	701-1100	 and	
                                               
15		 E.	Chaney,	‘Democratic	change	in	the	Arab	World:	Past	and	present’,	Brookings	Papers	on	Economic	
Activity	2012(1):	363-414.	
16		 The	papers	by	Haber	(supra	note	13)	and	Chaney	(supra	note	15)	stem	from	‘endowment’	and	‘law’	
perspectives	 respectively,	 while	 Malik	 and	 Awadallah	 (supra	 note	 14)	 amalgamate	 these	 two	
perspectives.	The	aim	of	our	paper,	however,	is	radically	different	from	that	of	the	above	studies.	We	
focus	on	the	errors	of	the	de	facto	religious	authorities	(fuqahāʿ),	who	made	the	Muslim	world	submit	
passively	 to	 the	 de	 jure	 autocratic	 leaders.	 This	 impacted	 on	 institutional	 building,	 and	 thus	 on	
economic	development.	Our	perspective	is	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	of	Stulz	and	Williamson	–	
R.M.	Stulz	&	R.	Williamson,	‘Culture,	openness,	and	finance’,	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	70	(2003):	
313-349	–	and	Acemoglu,	Johnson	and	Robinson	(supra	note	2)	that	emphasises	the	impact	of	culture	
(i.e.,	values	extracted	from	religious	scriptures)	on	policies	and	institutions.	Stulz	and	Williamson	(p.	
346)	contradict	the	perspective	of	Chaney	by	stating	that	‘indigenous	culture	eventually	can	reassert	
itself	 (against	 that	 of	 the	 conquering	 or	 colonizing	 one)	with	 a	 bang’.	 There	 are	also	 examples	 of	
countries	 deemed	 ‘democratic’	 by	 either	Haber	 or	 Chaney,	 or	 both,	 where	 the	 judiciary	 is	 deeply	
emasculated	by	the	meddling	of	the	executive	branch,	leading	to	the	weakening	of	property	rights	and	
thus	to	underdevelopment.	
17		 Huntington	attributes	the	lack	of	democracy	in	Arab	states,	which	are	rich	in	natural	resources,	to	the	
‘lack	 of	 accountability’	 emerging	 from	 an	 absence	 of	 taxation.	 That	 is,	 citizens	 are	 denied	
representation	when	they	are	not	taxed.	S.P.	Huntington,	The	Third	Wave:	Democratization	in	the	Late	
Twentieth	Century	(Norman,	OK:	University	of	Oklahoma	Press,	1991).		
18		 T.	 Kuran,	 ‘Why	 the	 Middle	 East	 is	 economically	 underdeveloped:	 Historical	 mechanisms	 of	
institutional	stagnation’,	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives	18	(2004):	71-90;	T.	Kuran,	‘The	logic	of	
financial	 westernization	 in	 the	 Middle	 East’,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 Behavior	 and	 Organization	 56	
(2005):	 593-615;	 T.	 Kuran,	 The	 Long	 Divergence:	 How	 Islamic	 Law	 Held	 Back	 the	 Middle	 East	
(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2011).	
19		 R.G.	 King	&	R.	 Levine,	 ‘Finance,	 entrepreneurship	and	 growth’,	 Journal	 of	Monetary	Economics	 32	
(1993):	513-542.	
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1101-1500.20	In	 the	 first	period,	 the	 formative	period	of	 Islamic	 law,	 the	Arab-Islamic	
world	had	233	distinct	commercial	occupations,	including	sellers,	middlemen,	brokers,	
weighers,	appraisers,	and	financiers.	In	the	second	period,	the	number	of	occupations	was	
220,	 roughly	 the	 same	(see	Figure	1).	Remarkably,	 the	number	of	unique	commercial	
occupations	in	the	bureaucracy	and	military	tripled,	and	the	number	of	educational,	legal,	
or	 religious	 occupations	 more	 than	 quintupled.	 This	 issue	 illustrates	 the	 inertia	 in	
commercial	organisations	and	the	stagnant	commercial	productivity,	with	the	 latter	 in	
particular	constituting	an	absence	of	a	key	driver	for	economic	growth.	
	
	
FIGURE	1	Distinct	occupations	in	Arab-Islamic	world,	701-1500	
	
	
	 	
Note:	Figure	1	has	been	constructed	from	data	obtained	from	Shatzmiller,	supra	note	20.	
	
Furthermore,	the	data	shows	that	between	1101	and	1500,	the	proportion	of	new	
commercial	 occupations	 was	 relatively	 low.	 Whereas	 more	 than	 four-fifths	 of	 all	
occupations	in	the	bureaucracy,	military,	education,	law,	and	religion	were	new,	only	half	
of	 the	 commercial	 occupations	 were	 so	 (see	 Table	 1).	 According	 to	 Kuran,	 ‘[This]	
relatively	 low	 occupational	 turnover	 in	 private	 commerce	 is	 consistent	 with	 loss	 of	
organizational	 dynamism’. 21 	This	 underdevelopment	 contrasts	 with	 Manchester,	
England,	in	1903,	where	77.2	per	cent	of	the	total	commercial	occupations	had	emerged	
over	the	previous	century.	
	
TABLE	1	New	occupations	in	Arab-Islamic	World,	1101-1500	
	
	 Pre-existing	
occupations		
(%	of	total)	
New	
occupations		
(%	of	total)	
	 42.7	 57.3	
	 	 10.9	 89.1	
	 	
	
16.1	 83.9	
	 22.2	 77.8	
	
Note:	The	above	table	has	been	constructed	from	data	obtained	from	Kuran,	supra	note	18.	
	
	
3		 	 	 	 	 	 	
                                               
20		 M.	Shatzmiller,	Labour	in	the	Medieval	Islamic	World	(Leiden:	E.J.	Brill,	1994).	
21		 Kuran,	supra	note	18	at	69.	
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There	 are	 two	 broad	 theories	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 Islam	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 economic	
growth:	 the	 impediment	 theory	 and	 the	 facilitator	 theory.	 Neither	 provides	 a	
comprehensive	explanation	of	the	Islamic-economic	nexus.	However,	their	influence	in	
the	literature	necessitates	an	elaboration	before	advancing	our	perspective.	
	
	 	 	
	
Since	the	mid-1990s,	studies	have	 focused	on	underdevelopment	 in	 the	Middle	East,	a	
region	of	the	world	that	once	enjoyed	a	high	standard	of	living	by	global	standards.	These	
studies	contend	that	underdevelopment	stems	from	certain	Islamic	beliefs	that	became	
formalised	in	the	teachings,	practices,	laws,	and	institutions	of	the	region.	Kuran	is	one	of	
the	best-known	advocates	of	this	position.22	He	identified	a	number	of	Islamic	beliefs	that	
impeded	development:	the	Qurʾanic	prohibition	of	interest	hampered	the	development	of	
financial	institutions	that	could	compete	and	prevent	European	entities’	domination	of	
the	region;	the	Islamic	law	of	commercial	partnerships	‘limited	enterprise	continuity’;	the	
Islamic	 inheritance	 system	 ‘hindered	 capital	 accumulation’;	 the	 waqf	 (charitable	
endowment)	 system	 ‘inhibited	 the	 pooling	 of	 resources’	 by	 other	 financial	
intermediaries;	and	the	Islamic	legal	system’s	aversion	to	the	concept	of	legal	personhood	
‘enfeebled	 private	 organisations’. 23 	Some	 of	 these	 institutions	 became	 sources	 of	
inefficiency.	 Thus,	 ‘if	 the	 impetus	 for	 financial	 modernization	 ultimately	 came	 from	
abroad,	the	fundamental	reason	is	that	Islam’s	traditional	institutions	blocked	indigenous	
paths	to	financial	development’.24	
Balla	 and	 Johnson	 argue	 that	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 eventually	 collapsed	 in	 the	
nineteenth	 century	because	property	 rights	had	not	been	 institutionalised.25	Although	
the	Christian-French	and	Muslim-Ottoman	fiscal	institutions	faced	similar	fiscal	crises	in	
the	early	seventeenth	century,	uncertain	property	rights	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	led	to	
different	 institutional	 outcomes.	 In	 France,	 tax	 collectors	 successfully	 restrained	 the	
monarch	from	imposing	collective-action	costs.	In	contrast,	tax	collectors	in	the	Ottoman	
Empire	 faced	excessive	 transaction	 costs	 in	organising	 the	 same.	Thus	 fiscal	 contracts	
were	more	 secure	 in	 France	 than	 in	 the	 latter.	 This	 security	 explains	why	 Christian-
French	 institutions	 strengthened,	 whilst	 those	 of	 the	 Muslim-Ottoman	 Empire	
weakened.26	
Using	a	game-theoretic	approach	that	models	the	conflict	between	the	political	and	
religious	authorities	in	the	Middle	East	and	the	West,	Rubin	also	argues	that	institutional	
differences	between	the	Islamic	Middle	East	and	the	Christian	West	contributed	to	the	
broader	economic	divergence.	.	The	outcome	of	the	model	is	contingent	on	the	extent	to	
which	early	Islamic	political	authority	derives	its	legitimacy	from	religious	authority.	This	
approach	 involves	 a	 feedback	 mechanism	 where	 improving	 economic	 conditions	 in	
Europe	 led	 to	 the	 relaxation	 of	 interest	 restrictions,	 simultaneously	 diminishing	 the	
                                               
22		 Supra	note	18.	
23		 T.	Kuran,	‘The	logic	of	financial	westernization	in	the	Middle	East’,	Journal	of	Economic	Behavior	and	
Organization	56	(2005):	594.	
24		 Ibid.,	p.	612.	
25		 E.	Balla	&	N.D.	 Johnson,	 ‘Fiscal	 crisis	and	 institutional	 change	 in	 the	Ottoman	Empire	and	France’,	
Journal	of	Economic	History	69	(2009):	809-845.	
26		 An	equivalent	perspective	is	espoused	in	Weede	in	the	cases	of	Russia	and	Turkey	with	respect	to	
Western	Europe.	Weede,	supra	note	10.	
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powers	of	the	Church.	These	interactions	did	not	take	place	in	the	Muslim	world,	despite	
similar	economic	conditions.27	
	
	 	 	
	
Chapra	 traces	 the	 degeneration	 of	 the	 Muslim	 world	 to	 the	 political	 illegitimacy	 of	
Muʾawiyah’s	 dynasty	 (r.	 661-684),	 in	 which	 hereditary	 succession	 was	 initiated,	
disregarding	the	consensus	of	the	community.28	In	the	absence	of	genuine	democracy,	a	
lack	of	transparency	gradually	affected	the	Muslim	socio-political	economy,	engendering	
restrictions	on	freedom	of	speech,	abuses	of	public	funds,	corruption,	poor	governance,	
and	 injustice.	 ‘As	 far	as	 Islam	 is	 concerned,	 it	 is	 itself	 a	victim	rather	 than	 the	 trigger	
mechanism’.29	Illegitimacy	in	the	political	field	also	affected	the	development	of	Islamic	
jurisprudence	(fiqh),	which	had	far-reaching	adverse	consequences	on	Muslim	society.	
The	disregard	of	Islamic	values	in	the	political	field	remains	at	the	root	of	dissent	between	
the	jurists	and	the	rulers.	The	rulers	either	penalised	or	prosecuted	more	conscientious	
and	vocal	jurists.	Thus	the	jurists	confined	themselves	to	their	religious	schools,	losing	
touch	with	 the	 rapidly	 changing	 environment.	 Consequently,	 discourse	 in	 the	 field	 of	
jurisprudence	suffered	and	lacked	the	dynamism	it	had	enjoyed	in	earlier	centuries.30	
Malik	 associates	 the	 degeneration	 of	 the	Muslim	world	with	 the	 evolution	of	 its	
political	 economy.31 	The	 structure	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 was	 one	 of	 an	 ‘absolutist	
political	system’	that	endorsed	initiatives	that	furthered	the	political	masters’	supremacy.	
Any	form	of	innovation	that	might	destabilise	their	political	power	was	either	outright	
curtailed	or	moderated	by	lack	of	private	incentives.32	Malik	questions	the	rationality	of	
                                               
27		 Rubin’s	analysis	departs	from	the	usual	welfare	approach	studying	the	conflict	of	 interest	between	
borrowers	and	lenders,	from	an	agency	theoretic	perspective.	His	study	demonstrates	the	economic	
disparity	between	the	Muslim	and	Christian	worlds	by	modelling	the	conflict	of	interest	between	the	
ruling	 elite	 and	 the	 religious	 establishment.	 His	 theoretical	 result,	 however,	 deviates	 from	
contemporary	real-world	practice.	This	is	because	the	co-option	of	the	religious	establishment	by	the	
political	 elite,	 especially	 in	 the	 economically	 well-off	 Arabian	 Gulf	 countries,	 should	 result	 in	 the	
decline	of	‘Islamic’	banking	services.	The	opposite	result	(i.e.,	an	upsurge	in	demand	for	these	services	
and	 the	 conscious	 decision	 by	 established	Western	 banks	 to	 expand	 their	 repertoire	 of	 services)	
contrasts	 starkly	with	 the	prognosis	of	Rubin.	 J.	Rubin,	 ‘Institutions,	 the	 rise	of	commerce	and	 the	
persistence	 of	 laws:	 Interest	 restrictions	 in	 Islam	 and	Christianity’,	Economic	 Journal	 121	 (2011):	
1310–1339.	
28		 M.U.	Chapra,	‘Ibn	Khaldun’s	theory	of	development:	Does	it	help	explain	the	low	performance	of	the	
present-day	Muslim	world?’,	Journal	of	Socio-Economics	37	(2008):	836-863.	
29		 Ibid.,	p.	846.	
30		 Ibid.	 Our	 major	 disagreement	 with	 Chapra’s	 analysis	 is	 that	 he	 absolves	 the	 jurists	 from	 blame.	
Historically,	 however,	 political	 rulers	 have	 derived	 their	 legitimacy	 from	 the	 religious	 elites.	 This	
contentious	issue	is	discussed	in	Section	4.	
31		 A.	Malik,	Was	the	Middle	East’s	Economic	Descent	a	Legal	or	Political	Failure?	Debating	the	Islamic	
Law	Matters	Thesis,	Working	Paper	WPS/2012-08,	Centre	for	the	Study	of	African	Economies	(CSAE),	
Oxford	University,	2012.	
32	 Goldstone,	 too,	 is	 of	 the	 view	 that	 Kuran’s	 analysis	 is	 incomplete	 because	 it	 fails	 to	mention	 the	
technological	upsurge	in	the	West,	especially	from	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries.	He	is	of	
the	view	that	Kuran	fails	to	address	several	problems	specific	to	the	Middle	East,	but	not	attributed	to	
Islam,	including:	autocratic	regimes,	tribalism,	guilds,	deterrence	to	investment	in	human	capital,	and	
reluctance	to	the	undertaking	of	innovations.	J.A.	Goldstone,	Islam,	Development,	and	the	Middle	East:	
A	 Comment	 on	 Timur	 Kuran’s	 Analysis,	 Forum	 Series	 on	 the	 Role	 of	 Institutions	 in	 Promoting	
Economic	Growth,	Mercatus	Center,	George	Mason	University,	June	24,	2003.	Retrieved	July	23,	2013:	
http://mercatus.org/publication/comments-timur-kurans-why-middle-east-economically-
underdeveloped-historical-mechanisms.	
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Kuran’s	view	on	the	backwardness	of	Muslim	states	in	comparison	with	the	West.33	To	
him,	a	configuration	of	reasons	underpinned	the	success	of	some	European	nations,	such	
as	geographical	advantage,	trading	acumen,	and	political	economy.	Europe’s	commercial	
success	was	not	achieved	by	‘internal	processes	alone’	but	was	‘aided	by	a	combination	
of	 commerce,	 coercion	and	colonisation’.	European	 firms	 invented	new	organisational	
forms	and	financing	mechanisms	against	a	backdrop	of	interstate	competition,	overseas	
expansion,	 and	 long-distance	 trade,	 ultimately	 manifesting	 in	 the	 Western	 corporate	
innovations	 of	 impersonal	 and	 permanently	 lived	 organisations,	 the	 separation	 of	
ownership	 and	 control,	 and	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 long-term	 capital	 through	 joint-stock	
companies.	Many	of	these	legal	and	corporate	innovations	were	partly	a	response	to	the	
needs	of	war-making	states	and	overseas	commercial	ventures.	
In	 this	 paper,	we	 contribute	 to	 the	 discourse	around	 Islam	 and	 development	 by	
building	on	 the	work	of	Timur	Kuran	and	providing	an	 important	 corrective	 to	 it.	We	
investigate	a	factor	hitherto	unexplored	in	the	academic	literature:	how	jurisprudential	
interpretation	 (ijtihād)	has	 shaped	 the	present	economies	of	Muslim	states.	This	 is	 in	
conformity	 with	 the	 view	 of	 political	 scientist	 Michael	 Fish,	 who	 states	 that	 ‘it	 is	 as	
dubious	 to	 try	 to	 locate	 the	 source	of	 social	practice	and	order	 in	scripture	 in	 Islamic	
settings	as	it	is	to	try	to	locate	them	there	in	Christian	and	Jewish	settings,	because	as	with	
all	 holy	 injunctions	 based	 on	 sacred	 text,	 interpretive	 traditions	 are	 powerful	 and	
ultimately	determine	practice’.34		
We	evaluate	the	role	of	the	pre-eminent	interpreters	of	Islam,	namely	the	Muslim	
jurists	 (fuqahāʾ),	 in	 impeding	 institutional	 change.	We	 focus	on	 their	 interpretation	of	
ribā,	arguing	that	 their	 failure	to	recognise	the	Qur'anic	ban	on	ribā	as	one	protecting	
property	 rights	 has	 led	 to	 flawed	 rationalisations	 that	miss	 the	Divine	 injunction	 and	
contributes	 to	 a	 weakened	 institutional	 framework	 that	 caves	 in	 to	 rent-seeking	
autocrats.35	
	
4	 s 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
This	section	delineates	the	factors	responsible	for	the	historic	economic	regression	of	the	
Muslim	world	and	identifies	the	requisites	to	stimulate	growth	and	development.	
	
	 	 y	 	 	 	( )	 	 	
	
Muhammad	Iqbal,	the	well-known	poet-philosopher	of	the	Indo-Pak	subcontinent,	
describes	 ijtihād	 as	 the	 elixir	 of	Muslim	 legal	 thought.	 For	 him,	 although	 the	 ultimate	
spiritual	basis	of	all	life	is	‘eternal	and	reveals	itself	in	variety	and	change,	that	is,	in	an	
ever	 dynamic	 universe’, 36 	there	 must	 also	 be	 a	 mechanism	 that	 accommodates	 for	
movement	 and	 change,	which	 are	 so	 characteristic	of	 the	human	 experience.	 The	 key	
principle	 that	 allows	 for	 adaption	 in	 Islam	 is	 ijtihād.	 Ijtihād	 means	 ‘to	 exert’	 in	 the	
terminology	of	Islamic	legal	theory.	Kamali	describes	it	as	‘the	total	expenditure	of	effort	
by	 a	mujtahid	 (capable	 scholar)	 to	 infer	with	a	 degree	 of	 probability	 the	 rules	 of	 the	
                                               
33		 A.	Malik,	 ‘Islamic	 law	 and	 development.	 A	 response	 to	Kuran’s	 “The	 Long	 Divergence”’,	 in	Eighth	
International	Conference	on	Islamic	Economics	and	Finance	in	Qatar	(Doha,	2011),	5.	
34		 M.S.	Fish,	‘Islam	and	authoritarianism’,	World	Politics	55	(2002):	37.	
35		 See	Q	(4:	161).	
36		 M.	Iqbal,	The	Reconstruction	of	Religious	Thought	in	Islam	(Lahore:	Sheikh	Mohammad	Ashraf,	1977),	
148.	
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Shari‘ah	(Islamic	law)	from	the	detailed	evidence	in	the	sources’.37	Kamali	reformulates	
the	definition	of	jurisprudential	interpretation	in	a	recent	monograph	on	Islamic	law	with	
a	view	to	overcoming	what	he	describes	as	‘difficulties	which	encumber	the	conventional	
theory	of	ijtihād	and	to	properly	make	it	an	integral	part	of	the	contemporary	legislative	
processes’;	 thus,	 in	 Kamali’s	 new	 conceptualisation,	 ijtihād	 is	 a	 ‘creative	 and	
comprehensive	 intellectual	 effort	 by	 qualified	 individuals	 and	 groups	 to	 derive	 the	
juridical	 ruling	 on	 a	 given	 issue	 from	 the	 sources	 of	 Sharī‘ah	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
prevailing	 circumstances	 of	 society’. 38 	The	 idea	 is	 most	 clearly	 adumbrated	 in	 the	
Prophetic	tradition	(ḥadīth):	‘when	a	judge	gives	a	decision,	having	tried	his	best	to	decide	
correctly	and	 is	right,	 there	are	two	rewards	 for	him;	and	 if	he	gives	a	 judgment	after	
having	tried	his	best	(to	arrive	at	a	correct	decision)	but	erred,	there	is	one	reward	for	
him’. 39 	Moreover,	 the	 traditions	 in	 which	 the	 Prophet	 is	 reported	 to	 have	 openly	
encouraged	independent	thought,	or	tacitly	approved	of	it,	are	too	numerous	to	ignore.	
His	 Companions,	 both	 during	 his	 lifetime	 and	 after	 his	 death,	 applied	 their	 reason	 to	
problems	in	a	relatively	unencumbered	way.		
However,	 the	 first	 significant	 political	 expansion	 of	 Islam	 (in	 the	 eight	 century)	
circumscribed	 the	 opportunity	 for	 unfettered	 ijtihād.	 Doctors	 of	 the	 law,	 both	
independent	scholars	and	appointees	of	the	state,	largely	agreed	on	what	was	considered	
the	‘correct	method’	for	ijtihād.	The	jurists	limited	the	method	to	several	schemas	and	the	
type	of	person	qualified	to	perform	it.	Once	the	accumulated	wealth	of	legal	thought	found	
a	final	expression	in	the	orthodox	schools	of	law,	it	comprised	just	three	degrees	of	ijtihād:	
complete	 authority	 in	 legislation,	which	 is	 practically	 confined	 to	 the	 founders	 of	 the	
schools;	relative	authority,	which	is	to	be	exercised	within	the	limits	of	a	particular	school;	
and	special	authority,	which	relates	to	the	determination	of	the	law	that	is	applicable	to	a	
particular	 case	 unexplored	 by	 the	 founders.40 	Since	 Sunni	 orthodoxy	 established	 the	
theoretical	 foundations	 of	 Islamic	 law,	 it	made	 the	 qualifications	 for	 this	 post	 almost	
impossible	to	attain	at	a	practical	level.	Thus	the	possibility	of	developing	and	evolving	
new	theoretical	and	hermeneutical	frameworks	became	virtually	impossible.	
By	820,	ijtihād	had	virtually	become	reducible	to	deductive	reasoning	(qiyās),	in	
large	 part	 due	 to	 the	 jurist	 and	 legal	 theoretician	 al-Shāficī	 (d.	 820),	 whose	 efforts	
circumscribed	 the	unfettered	use	of	opinion.41	A	 rudimentary	and	almost	unconscious	
analogical	method	was	always	present	in	Islam.	When	jurists	were	faced	with	a	new,	or	
refined,	 complex	 issue,	 they	 referred	 either	 to	 a	 verse	 in	 the	 Qur’an,	 or	 to	 a	 general	
principle,	or	to	a	specific	case	in	the	practice	of	the	Prophet	or	the	early	Muslims	(Sunna).	
But	in	both	the	choice	of	the	model	and	the	discernment	of	the	point	of	resemblance,	the	
jurists	 had	 almost	 unbridled	 liberty	 in	 their	 decision-making,	 a	 liberty	 that	 produced	
results	that	ranged	from	sound	analogy	to	almost	complete	arbitrariness.	
                                               
37		 M.H.	Kamali,	Shari'ah	Law:	An	Introduction	(Oxford:	One	World,	2008),	162.	
38		 Ibid.,	p.	165.	
39		 See	A.H.	Siddiqui	(trans.),	Ṣaḥīḥ	Muslim	(New	Delhi:	Kitab	Bhavan,	1986),	chap.	692,	ḥadīth	nos.	
4261-4263.	
40		 For	more	information	on	the	construction	of	orthodoxy	by	the	religious	authority	(ʿulamāʾ),	see	A.	El	
Shamsy,	 ‘The	 social	 construction	 of	 orthodoxy’,	 in	 T.	Winter	 (ed.),	 The	 Cambridge	 Companion	 to	
Classical	Islamic	Theology	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	97-118.	
41		 For	 this	 development,	 see	 F.	 Rahman,	 Islam	 and	 Modernity:	 Transformation	 of	 an	 Intellectual	
Tradition	(Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2002).	On	al-Shāficī’s	role	in	the	early	development	
of	Muslim	legal	theory,	see	J.	Schacht,	The	Origins	of	Muhammadan	Jurisprudence	(Oxford:	Clarendon,	
1967).	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 jurists	 of	 the	 Ẓāhirī	 school	 of	 law,	Shīca	 jurists	and	 some	Muctazila	
theologians	were	opposed	to	analogical	reasoning	as	a	method	in	law.	
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Inductive	reasoning	(istiqrāʾ)	was	another	widely	used	method	of	legal	reasoning	
prior	to	the	second	half	of	the	eighth	century.	However,	by	al-Shāficī’s	time,	it	was	seldom	
used,	 as	 it	 was	 a	 casualty	 of	 the	 sustained	 attempt	 of	mainly	 Shāficī	 jurists	 to	 create	
analytical	consistency	and	standardise	the	law.42	The	ratiocination	of	 jurists,	with	very	
few	exceptions,	thereafter	revolved	around	the	effective	cause	(cilla)	of	an	existing	legal	
judgment	 rather	 than	constituting	an	applied	attempt	 to	extend	 the	 law	based	on	 the	
objectives	(maqāṣid)	of	Sharīca	or	on	economic	rationale	(ḥikma).	The	 jurists	believed	
that	effective	cause	was	an	objective	attribute	that	did	not	vary	from	person	to	person	or	
change	with	 circumstances.	 It	was	 therefore	deemed	 the	most	 suitable	 foundation	 for	
developing	the	law.43	
In	many	legal	cases,	this	textualistic	approach	to	legal	reasoning	resulted	in	glaring	
errors.44	For	example,	 jurists	 failed	to	establish	the	correct	rationale	 for	 the	 injunction	
pertaining	 to	 barter	 (i.e.,	 the	 inequitable	 spot	 exchanges	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 Islamic	
literature	as	ribā	al-faḍl).	Instead,	they	determined	the	ratio	legis	as	an	attribute	intrinsic	
to	 the	 specific	 commodities	 stated	 in	 the	 well-known	 tradition	 (ḥadīth).	 This	
determination	 led	 to	 the	 contrasting	 interpretations	 amongst	 the	 jurists	 of	 the	 main	
schools	of	Islamic	legal	thought	around	a	series	of	corollary	issues	(see	Table	2).45	With	
respect	to	the	injunction	pertaining	to	the	exchange	of	deferred	financial	claims	(ribā	al-
nasīʾah),	the	jurists	uniformly	prohibited	it	for	loans	because	they	believed	money	to	be	
unproductive,	so	no	interest,	however	insignificant,	can	be	charged	for	credit.	Ebrahim	et	
al.	find	that	the	promotion	of	property	rights	is	the	economic	rationale	(ḥikma)	behind	
the	injunction	of	ribā	al-nasīʾah	(see	Table	3).46	This	promotion	is	premised	on	the	Qur'an	
and	the	Sunna,	which	eschew	any	expropriation	for	both	parties	in	a	contract.	Prohibiting	
ribā	al-nasīʾah	erects	three	constraints	in	particular:	itensures	that	financial	facilities	are	
priced	 to	avoid	 financial	 repression	as	well	 as	negative	 leverage;	 it	 alleviates	 financial	
fragility;	and	it	mitigates	the	financial	exclusion	of	the	underprivileged.47	
The	 first	 constraint	 reinforces	 economic	 sustainability,	 the	 second	 constraint	
alleviates	a	financial	crisis,	and	the	third	constraint	brings	about	the	cohesion	of	disparate	
social	classes.	This	cohesion	mitigates	civil	strife	and	builds	a	harmonious	society.	These	
issues	 are	 especially	 important	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 recent	 sub-prime	 crisis. 48	
Understanding	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 injunction	 of	 ribā	 al-nasīʾah	 is	 critical	 for	
economic	development	and	thus	 for	advancing	growth.	The	business	history	literature	
especially	illustrates	how	the	jurists’	misunderstanding	of	the	third	constraint	has	led	to	
the	 underdevelopment	 of	 institutions	 that	 might	 have	 helped	 the	 poor	 and	
underprivileged	 in	 the	Muslim	world.49	The	 jurists	made	 exceptions	 for	 commutative	
                                               
42		 Inductive	 reasoning	 did	 find	 continued	 life,	 to	 some	 degree,	 in	 the	 doctrine	 of	 public	 interest	
(maṣlaḥa),	and	equity	(istiḥsān).	For	more	on	these	two	juristic	tools,	see	M.H.	Kamali,	Principles	of	
Islamic	Jurisprudence	(Cambridge:	The	Islamic	Texts	Society	2003),	275-278.	
43		 I.A.K.	Nyazee,	Theories	of	 Islamic	Law:	The	Methodology	of	 Ijtihād	 (Chicago,	 IL:	Kazi	Publications,	
1994).	
44		 Rahman,	supra	note	41.	
45		 Ibn	Rushd,	The	Distinguished	Jurist’s	Primer:	Bidayat	al-mujtahid	wa	nihayat	al-muqtasid	(Reading,	
Berkshire:	Garnet	Publishing,	1996),	1:160.	
46		 Ebrahim	et	al.,	supra	note	5.	
47		 Ibid.	
48		 A.	Kirman,	‘The	economic	crisis	is	a	crisis	for	economic	theory’,	CESifo	Economic	Studies	56	(2010):	
498-535.	
49		 P.D.	Martino	&	 S.	 Sarsour,	 ‘Microcredit	 in	 Palestine	 (1995-2008):	A	 business	 history	 perspective’,	
Business	History	54	(2012):	441-461.	
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exchange	with	commodities	that	they	deemed	to	be	free	of	the	attribute	of	ribā	(termed	
as	 non-ribawī	 commodities	 or	 māl-ghayr-ribawī).	 For	 example,	 they	 deemed	 the	
exchange	of	five	cubits	of	a	specific	cloth	for	six	of	the	same	as	permissible,	or	an	egg	for	
two,	or	a	sheep	for	two,	on	the	condition	that	the	exchanges	were	on	the	spot.	Only	the	
deferment	of	a	payment	of	either	counter	value	rendered	the	exchange	impermissible.50	
These	views	were	first	challenged	only	in	the	age	of	the	great	reformers	of	the	nineteenth	
and	early	twentieth	centuries.	
	
	 	
                                               
50		 W.	Al-Zuhayli,	 ‘The	 juridical	meaning	 of	 riba’,	 in	A.S.	Thomas	 (ed.),	 Interest	 in	 Islamic	 Economics:	
Understanding	riba	(New	York:	Routledge,	2006),	28.	
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TABLE	2	Classical	Sharīca	scholars’	perspective	on	the	ribā	prohibition	
	
	 	 	
	 - ḍl	-	the	hidden	ribā	 	 - h	-	the	evident	ribā	
	 	 	
Relates	to	spot	exchanges		 Relates	to	deferred	exchanges	
	 	 	 	
Excess	in	exchange	without	an	
equivalent	counter	value	
Delay	 in	 payments	 with	 an	 increase	
above	 the	 original	 amount	 at	 the	
settlement	 date;	 or	 vice	 versa	 (i.e.,	
lowering	 the	 debt	 in	 return	 for	 an	
accelerated	payment)	
	 	 	 	 	
Specifically	prohibited	in	transactions	involving	the	six	commodities	
in	the	Sunna	(see	Saḥīḥ	Al-Bukhārī	Vol.	3,	34:2134;	Ṣaḥīḥ	Muslim	
Vol.	4,	22:1584).	Impermissibility	of	other	commodities	is	generally	
based	on	the	nomenclature	developed	by	the	Sharīca	scholars	from	
the	major	Sunni	schools	of	thought,	namely:	intrinsic,	or	monetary,	
value	and	volume	or	weight.	
However,	additional	conditions	are	not	shared	amongst	the	
major	Sunni	schools,	that	is:	(i)	the	commodity	being	edible,	
nutritious,	or	storable;	(ii)	the	threshold	for	which	the	condition	on	
weight	or	volume	becomes	applicable;	and	(iii)	the	interpretation	on	
‘oneness	in	kind’	or	genus	of	the	exchanged	commodities.		
Following	this	nomenclature,	commodities	that	do	not	have	these	
characteristics	are	excluded	from	the	ribā	prohibition:	(i)	non-
fungibles	or	(ii)	fungibles	that	are	measured	by	length	or	counted	
which	may	in	effect	be	significant.	For	example,	in	the	exchange	of	
animals	or	cloth.		
	 on	 	
The	ribā	prohibition	is	aimed	at	avoiding	exploitation	and	fraud	for	
the	protection	of	one’s	property,	fairness,	and	justice.	The	injunction	
of	ribā	al-faḍl	arises	as	blocking	means	to	the	evident	ribā	that	
prevents	access	to	a	greater	evil.	The	restriction	on	the	exchange	of	
the	six	commodities	in	the	Sunna	extends	from	them,	representing	
food	staples	and	currencies,	which	were	essential	during	the	period	of	
the	prophet	Muhammad	and	Caliphs	(successors)	for	survival	and	
measure	of	price	respectively.		
	
Source:	Ebrahim	et	al.,	supra	note	5.	
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TABLE	3	Economic	perspective	of	the	ribā	prohibition	
	
	 	 	
	 - ḍl	–	the	hidden	ribā	 	 - h	-	the	evident	ribā	
	 	 	
Barter	transactions		
(This	category	can	also	include	
market	manipulations,	
seigniorage,	etc.)	
Plain-vanilla	or	structured-debt	
contracts	
(This	category	can	also	include	
excessive	or	inadequate	
compensation	packages,	inequitable	
taxes,	etc.)	
	 		 	
Exchange	is	inefficient	because	it	
can	expropriate	either	party’s	
assets	in	the	exchange	of	goods.	
	
The	contract	is	(i)	inefficient	and	has	
the	potential	to	(ii)	expropriate	
assets	of	either	lender	or	borrower;	
(iii)	exacerbate	financial	fragility	and	
(iv)	induce	financial	exclusion.	
	
	
In	 general,	 the	 ribā	 prohibition	 delineates	 protection	 of	 rights	 of	 both	
contracting	 parties.	 This	 is	 retrospective	 of	 the	 Sharīca	 that	 accords	
protection	 of	 property	 rights	 as	 one	 of	 the	 five	essential	 elements	 of	 the	
objectives	of	the	law.	
	
Source:	Ebrahim	et	al.,	supra	note	5.	
	
However,	 when	 the	 jurists	 failed	 to	 draw	 boundaries	 because	 of	 the	 paucity	 of	
philosophical	or	economic	insight,	they	facilitated	the	circumvention	of	the	prohibition	
pertaining	to	property	rights	(ribā)	by	individuals	and	firms	by	using	ruses.	The	outcome	
was	that	Islamic	financial	structures	were	legalised	with	the	exception	of	those	that	the	
jurists	had	delineated	as	non-commodities.	If	the	jurists	had	identified	the	expropriation	
of	wealth	–	or,	in	other	terms,	the	protection	of	property	rights	–	as	the	categorical	ratio,	
then	history	might	have	unfolded	in	a	different	way	(see	Table	3).	Because	pre-modern	
economies	were	not	developed	like	the	economies	of	today,	the	short-term	consequences	
of	the	jurists’	failure	were	perhaps	not	severe.	But,	because	modernity	brought	with	it	
more	complex	market	structures,	the	effect	of	 their	failure	was	devastating	in	the	long	
term.	
Indeed,	with	the	onset	of	modernity,	the	lack	of	enterprise	on	the	part	of	jurists,	and	
more	importantly,	the	entering	of	traditionally	trained	jurists	into	spheres	of	human	life	
that	demanded	technical	knowledge,	began	to	have	implications	for	the	development	of	
Muslim	societies.	To	date,	there	is	still	no	clear	formulation	by	the	jurists	on	the	economic	
rationale	behind	the	core	Islamic	injunctions	related	to	financial	matters,	which	leads	to	
the	apparent	disconnect	in	the	present	practice	of	Islamic	banking	and	finance.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
The	incoherent	jurisprudential	interpretation	(ijtihād)	manifests	itself	in	Islamic	banking	
and	 finance	 in	 the	 form	of	ḥiyal	 (ruses).	Khan	 terms	ruses	as	a	 ‘de-facto	 conventional	
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financial	 transaction’	under	an	 ‘Islamic	 terminology’,	 in	other	words,	 ‘duping’.51	What,	
then,	is	the	primary	reason	behind	the	use	of	ḥiyal	in	Islamic	banking	and	finance?	
From	the	perspective	of	Muslim	jurists	and	theologians,	Islamic	law	assesses	every	
action,	whether	of	the	limbs,	mind,	or	heart,	as	having	the	quality	of	ḥusn	(seemliness	or	
conformity)	 or	qubḥ	 (unseemliness	 or	 deformity).	 These	 qualities,	 according	 to	most	
theologians	and	 jurists,	 cannot	be	known	by	 reason	or	natural	 law	–	 they	 can	only	be	
known	by	Divine	revelation.52	This	logic	holds	true	whatever	the	action,	and	even	when	
an	 action	 is	 self-evidently	 a	 crime	 (e.g.,	 murder	 or	 theft).	 Anderson	 asserts	 that	 the	
dominant	theological	school	in	Islamic	history	(i.e.,	the	Ashcarīs)	‘firmly	denied	that	man’s	
reason	is	competent	to	apprehend	the	differences	between	virtue	and	vice,	or	even	that	
such	 categories	 exist	 of	 themselves,	 or	 have	 any	 meaning	 at	 all,	 apart	 from	 divine	
revelation’.53	In	essence,	God	does	not	command	or	prohibit	an	act	because	 it	 is	either	
intrinsically	good	or	intrinsically	evil;	rather,	his	commanding	an	act	makes	that	act	good,	
and	his	prohibiting	an	act	makes	that	act	evil.	
We	find	the	most	serious	implication	to	the	Muslim	world	is	that	its	theologians	and	
jurists	have	not	worked	out	a	system	of	ethics	that	can	serve	as	a	foundation	for	natural	
law	 or	 human	 positive	 law.	 Furthermore,	 since	 Islamic	 law	 very	 early	 in	 its	 history	
became	a	static	edifice	of	strict	laws,	a	cleavage	between	theory	and	practice	arose.	And	
although	 customary	 law	 had	 no	 official	 locus	 standi	 in	 jurisprudence,	 the	 fact	 is	 that	
people	act	on	what	 conforms	to	 their	predilections.54	This	 is	often	outside	of	 the	 legal	
framework,	where	people	conduct	their	day-to-day	dealings	in	accordance	with	the	real	
world.	
The	jurists,	in	their	attempt	to	respond	to	people’s	need	to	dispense	with	the	strict	
rules	of	the	law,	began	to	produce	the	extensive	literature	on	ḥiyal.	By	these	means,	the	
interested	parties,	who	were	confronted	by	strict	laws,	could	achieve	desirable	results	by	
perfectly	legal	means	in	the	economic	conditions	of	their	time.	As	elaborated	by	Schacht,	
‘The	 earliest	 ḥiyal	 (ruses)	 were	 merely	 simple	 evasions	 of	 irksome	 prohibitions	 by	
merchants,	 but	 very	 soon	 the	 religious	 scholars	 themselves	 started	 creating	 little	
masterpieces	of	elaborate	juridical	constructions	and	advising	interested	parties	in	their	
use’.55	The	overwhelming	majority	of	jurists	accepted	these	ḥiyal.56	Even	Ibn	Qayyim	al-
Jawziyya,	otherwise	a	staunch	advocate	of	the	law,	discusses	ḥiyal	at	great	length,	citing	
numerous	works	dedicated	to	them.57	He	distinguished	‘lawful	ruses’,	by	which	a	lawful	
end	 is	 achieved	 by	 lawful	 means,	 from	 those	 that	 are	 ‘forbidden’,	 which	 he	 declares	
invalid.		
                                               
51		 F.	 Khan,	 ‘How	 “Islamic”	 is	 Islamic	 Banking?’,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 Behavior	 and	 Organization	 76	
(2010):	818.	
52		 S.A.J.	 Stelzer,	 ‘Ethics’,	 in	 T.	Winter	 (ed.),	The	Cambridge	 Companion	 to	 Classical	 Islamic	 Theology	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008),	161-179.	
53		 J.N.D.	Anderson,	‘Law	as	a	social	force	in	Islamic	culture	and	history’,	Bulletin	of	S.O.A.S.	20	(1957):	
14.	
54		 Ibid.	
55		 J.	Schacht,	‘Problems	of	modern	Islamic	legislation’,	Studia	Islamica	12	(1960):	102.	
56		 The	Traditionists	(ahl	al-ḥadīth),	in	keeping	with	their	general	approach	to	questions	of	religious	law,	
rejected	ḥiyal.	Bukhārī	(d.256/870),	too,	devoted	a	whole	‘book’	(no.	90)	of	his	Ṣaḥīḥ	to	combating	
them.	According	to	Schacht,	some	followers	of	the	Ḥanbalī	school	too,	are	on	record	as	opponents	of	
ḥiyal.	J.	Schacht,	‘Hiyal’,	in	Encyclopaedia	of	Islam,	Second	Edition	[EI2],	Brill	Online,	2012.	
57		 Ibn	Qayyim	al-Jawziyya,	Shams	al-Dīn	Abu	cAbd	Allah	Muhammad,	Iclām	al-muwaqqicīn	can	rabb	al-
cālamīn	(Beirut:	Dar	al-Kotob	al-Ilmiyah,	2004).	
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The	first	group	comprises	numerous	devices	in	commercial	law.		For	example,	one	
fundamental	error	that	involves	a	ruse	is	a	 ‘credit	sale’,	which	imitates	a	collateralised	
interest-bearing	 loan	 (i.e.,	 a	 banking	 murābaḥa).	 This	 ruse	 arose	 because	 jurists,	
misconstruing	 the	 injunction	 of	 ribā	 literally	 as	 an	 ‘increase’	 or	 ‘growth’,	 segregated	
commodities	into	two	types:	those	with	the	characteristics	of	ribā	(māl	ribawī)	and	those	
without	them	(māl	ghayr	ribawī)	(see	Table	2).	The	assets	with	the	characteristics	of	ribā	
were	generally	used	in	lieu	of	money	or	commodities,	which	provided	sustenance.	Some	
schools	defined	these	assets	as	fungible	goods	(i.e.,	goods	that	are	measurable	by	volume	
or	weight).58	This	definition	 led	them	to	conclude,	erroneously,	 that	 the	historic	credit	
sale	(murābaḥa)	is	permissible	because	it	involves	an	exchange	on	the	spot	of	an	asset	
devoid	of	ribā	 (such	as	a	property)	with	an	asset	endowed	with	ribā	 (such	as	money)	
deferred.	
The	misconception	persisted	because	the	early	jurists	made	their	decisions	during	
the	time	of	the	prophet	Muhammad	and	of	the	generations	that	followed	him,	which	was	
an	era	of	bare	subsistence	in	which	no	financial	intermediaries	existed	(such	as	we	have	
in	 modern	 times).	 They	 made	 these	 decisions	 without	 understanding	 the	 economic	
implications	of	the	credit	sale	as	we	do	today.	Financial	economists	rationalise	credit	sales	
to	the	absence	of	financial	markets	in	the	medieval	era.	This	is	articulated	in	Sen:	‘When	
financial	markets	are	imperfect,	a	seller	can	find	it	optimal	to	offer	a	menu	of	deferred	
payment	plans’.59	That	 is,	credit	sales	 fundamentally	enhance	the	demand	for	goods	 in	
the	real	sector	of	the	economy	because	they	are	contingent	on	the	elasticity	of	demand	of	
the	asset	being	sold.60		
The	 ruse	 of	 credit	 sales	 (i.e.,	 banking	murābaḥa),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 does	 not	
incorporate	the	elasticity	of	demand	of	the	asset	supposedly	being	‘sold’.	It	is	priced	using	
an	interest-based	index	and	suffers	from	the	same	flaws	as	conventional	debt.	That	is,	it	
is	a	fragile	facility	endowed	with	the	capacity	to	extricate	assets	and	financially	exclude	
the	underprivileged.	However,	it	is	not	economically	efficient,	even	though	it	alleviates	
adverse	 selection,	moral	hazard,	 and	 the	agency	 cost	of	debt	due	 to	 the	 collateralised	
nature	of	the	debt.61	
The	 legitimisation	of	 the	banking	murābaḥa	by	the	 jurists	has	 led	to	yet	another	
violation	 of	 Islamic	 law:	 non-collateralised	 conventional	 loans,	 known	 as	 tawarruq	
(literally,	‘monetisation’).	This	facility	is	structured	by	employing	a	pretentious	purchase	
of	a	real	asset	in	conjunction	with	a	simultaneous	sale	of	the	same	asset	to	a	third	party.62	
This	stratagem	yields	a	financial	facility	that	suffers	not	only	from	adverse	selection	and	
moral	hazard	but	also	from	a	high	agency	cost	of	debt	because	it	is	not	collateralised.	It	is	
also	less	efficient	than	a	credit	sale	because	of	the	high	cost	of	funding,	which	yields	a	low	
debt	capacity.	
These	two	examples	illustrate	that	the	current	practice	of	Islamic	banking,	which	is	
based	on	 implementing	medieval	 (and	often	 inefficient)	 Islamic	 financial	 instruments,	
                                               
58		 Al-Zuhayli,	supra	note	50	at	26-54.	
59		 A.	 Sen,	 ‘Seller	 financing	 of	 consumer	 durables’,	 Journal	 of	 Economics	 and	Management	 Strategy	 7	
(1998):	435.	
60		 M.	Rashid	&	D.	Mitra,	‘Price	elasticity	of	demand	and	an	optimal	cash	discount	rate	in	credit	policy’,	
Financial	Review	34	(1999):	113-126.	
61		 A	 banking	 murābaḥa	 is	 generally	 more	 expensive	 than	 a	 ribawī	 debt	 contract	 due	 to	 reduced	
economies	of	scale	and	the	incremental	expenses	of	documenting	the	subterfuge	(i.e.,	paying	sharīca	
scholars	for	their	approval).	See	M.S.	Ebrahim	&	M.	Sheikh,	‘Debt	instruments	in	Islamic	finance’,	Arab	
Law	Quarterly	30	(2016):	185-198.	
62		 C.	Imber,	Ebu's-su'ud:	The	Islamic	Legal	Tradition	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	1997).	
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represents	 nothing	 less	 than	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 religious	 establishment	 to	 engage	 in	
jurisprudential	interpretation	(ijtihād).	This	issue	is	reiterated	in	Ebrahim	and	Rahman,	
who	 find	 that	 the	 medieval	 Islamic	 forward	 sale	 is	 less	 efficient	 than	 conventional	
futures.63	
	
	 s 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
When	the	Qur’anic	 imperative	outlawing	ribā	(i.e.,	 the	charging	of	 interest	on	 loans	as	
deduced	by	the	jurists)	was	first	revealed	in	the	final	years	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad’s	
mission,	it	was	nothing	short	of	a	command	to	the	believing	Muslim	to	act	with	loving	
kindness	 towards	 his	 fellow	human	beings.	 The	Qur’an	 (2:276)	 in	 particular	 issued	 a	
command	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 virtues	 of	 cooperation	 and	mutual	 support	 via	 charitable	
lending.64	Muslim	creditors	are	entreated	to	lend	without	interest,	even	if	vulnerable	to	
actual	 and	 potential	 financial	 deprivation.	 This	 Qur’anic	 imperative	 conflicts	with	 the	
rules	of	natural	law,	which	find	no	objection	to	an	agreement	freely	entered	into	by	two	
parties.	Even	when	it	is	doubtful	that	both	parties	are	acting	completely	freely	–	such	as	
when	an	impoverished	borrower	out	of	desperation	accepts	unfair	contractual	terms	on	
a	loan	–	natural	law	considers	it	fair	for	creditors	to	impose	a	moderate	rate	of	interest	
on	 loans.	 Creditors,	 after	 all,	 risk	 losing	 all	 their	money	 (e.g.,	 if	 borrowers	 default	 or	
abscond	with	the	funds).	Moreover,	even	if	the	debt	is	repaid,	creditors	are	deprived	of	
the	use	of	their	own	money	during	the	loan	period.	
The	demands	of	the	market	constituted	an	irrepressible	force	that	precluded	an	in	
toto	ban	on	loan	 interest	by	Muslim	authorities.	This	 fact	 is	made	abundantly	clear	by	
Islamic	legal	literature,	as	jurists	of	all	legal	schools	from	at	least	the	ninth	century	were	
keen	to	limit	the	meaning	of	ribā	and,	by	extension,	its	application	in	the	real	world	of	
financial	transactions.	Overwhelmingly,	Islamic	jurists	decided	that	the	remit	of	ribā	was	
specific	to	fungibles	measured	in	volume	or	weight,	which	added	a	further	condition	of	
oneness	of	kind.	Commodities	measured	by	any	other	criteria,	such	as	length	or	number,	
were	not	deemed	ribawī.	Neither	were	non-fungibles	(e.g.,	animals,	carpets,	land,	houses,	
and	 trees).65	For	 these,	 the	 jurists	 considered	 an	 exchange	 in	 unequal	 amounts	 to	 be	
lawful,	even	though	this	undermined	the	very	rationale	for	the	prohibition	of	ribā,	a	fact	
that	the	jurists	themselves	had	pointed	out.	
Why	have	the	 jurists’	errors	not	come	to	 light	sooner?	One	reason	might	be	that	
financial	economics	has	only	evolved	as	a	separate	field	in	approximately	the	last	sixty	
years.	In	contrast,	the	rudiments	of	Islamic	financial	law,	which	developed	almost	1,200	
years	 ago,	 remained	 a	 static	 edifice,	 as	 its	 formulators	 failed	 to	 keep	 pace	 with	 the	
changing	intellectual	and	socio-economic	environment.	As	Robinson	explains:	
	
Religious	 authority,	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 produce	 authoritative	 interpretation,	
derived	from	the	Quran	and	the	life	of	the	Prophet,	lay	with	the	'ulamā.	They	were	
the	recipients	of	the	traditions	of	Islamic	scholarship	which	had	built	up	through	
time.	 They	 were	 proud	 of	 the	 many	 ijāzahs	 [authorisations]	 they	 possessed,	
permitting	them	to	transmit	the	great	scholarly	works	of	the	past.	They	relied	on	
                                               
63		 M.S.	Ebrahim	&	S.	Rahman,	 ‘On	the	Pareto-optimality	of	conventional	futures	over	Islamic	forward	
contracts:	 Implications	 for	 emerging	 Muslim	 economies’,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 Behavior	 and	
Organization	56(2)	(2005):	273-295.	
64		 Al-Zuhayli,	supra	note	50	at	26-54.	
65		 Ibid.	
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the	authority	of	these	and	other	works	as	they	strove	to	make	revelation	in	the	
form	of	 law	relevant	 to	 the	problems	of	 their	 time.	Throughout	 they	 strove	 to	
prevent	 others	 muscling	 in	 on	 their	 monopoly,	 whether	 they	 were	 sufis	 or	
sultans.66	
	
The	 monopoly	 that	 the	 jurists	 fought	 hard	 for,	 and	 indeed	 enjoyed,	 has	 had	 a	
detrimental	effect	on	the	recent	history	of	Muslim	communities,	especially	in	the	realms	
of	economics,	political	leadership,	and	social	policy.	It	also	provides	ammunition	to	those	
critics	who	allege	that	Islam	has	held	back	the	progress	of	the	Muslim	world.	It	does	not	
help	that	some	jurists	extricate	economic	surplus	from	the	industry.67,	68	This	issue	is	also	
corroborated	by	Kahf:	
	
The	 'ulamā	 in	 the	 1950s	 had	 weather-affected,	 dried	 skin	 hands	 and	 humble	
clothing,	 sitting	 in	 the	 cold,	 teaching	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 mosques	 in	 Cairo,	
Damascus,	Aleppo	and	Baghdad,	are	now	replaced	with	soft-living	 'ulamā	who	
are	 used	 to	 luxurious	 garments	 and	 services	of	 five-star	hotels	 and	 expensive	
restaurants.	This	new	life	style	of	Islamic	banks’	 'ulamā	has	resulted	in	certain	
changes	in	viewpoint	as	well.	Many	of	them	are	now	accused	of	being	bankers’	
window-dressers	and	of	over-stretching	the	rules	of	the	Sharī’ah	to	provide	easy	
fatāwā	for	the	new	breed	of	bankers.69	
	
Kahf’s	point	is	further	corroborated	in	an	extensive	study	by	Zaman,	which	illustrates	that	
the	culamāʾ	in	recent	times	have	found	Islamic	finance	to	be	a	very	useful	way	of	regaining	
power	 after	 more	 than	 a	 century	 of	 having	 had	 virtually	 no	 role	 to	 play	 except	 in	
judgments	related	to	personal	status	law	and	ritual	practice.70	
The	 jurists’	errors	also	did	not	come	to	light	sooner	because	the	various	schools,	
together	 with	 their	 respective	 doctrines	 in	 Islam,	 sedimented,	 which	 to	 some	 extent	
stifled	critical	thinking	(insofar	as	Muslims	were	exhorted	to	think	strictly	in	line	with	
their	school	of	thought).	This	process	has	also	led	to	what	Al-Alwani	describes	as	a	‘crisis	
in	 fiqh	 (jurisprudence)’,	 driven	 by	 an	 agglomeration	 of	 errors	 in	 what	 is	 a	 static	
jurisprudential	 interpretation	 (ijtihād).71	This	 description	 contrasts	with	 the	 dynamic	
jurisprudential	interpretation	that	Ibn	Qayyim	Al-Jawziyya	espouses.72	The	crisis	began	
to	beleaguer	Muslim	economies	when	people	unquestioningly	followed	the	rigid	rules	of	
law	and	began	blindly	following	the	jurists’	rulings.	This	blindness	stripped	ijtihād	of	the	
dynamism	it	had	enjoyed	from	the	earliest	centuries	of	Islam.	It	is	thus	unsurprising	that	
                                               
66		 F.	Robinson,	‘Crisis	of	Islam:	Crisis	of	authority?’,	Royal	Asiatic	Society	of	Great	Britain	and	Ireland	3	
(2009):	344.	
67		 It	is	ironic	that	the	religious	establishment	legitimises	its	monopoly	by	misconstruing	Qur’anic	verses	
8:	 29	 and	 57:	 28,	 which	 promise	 to	 endow	 God-fearing	 people	 the	 criterion	 between	 truth	 and	
falsehood.	Yet,	it	does	not	pay	any	heed	to	the	saying	of	the	Prophet	(ḥadīth)	that	restrains	them	from	
going	beyond	their	mandate	into	temporal	matters,	which	are	highly	technical	in	nature	(see	Siddiqui,	
supra	note	39	at	chap.	986,	ḥadīth	5831).	
68		 Khan,	supra	note	51.	
69		 M.	Kahf,	‘Islamic	banks:	The	rise	of	a	new	power	alliance	of	wealth	and	Sharī'ah	scholarship’,	in	C.M.	
Henry	&	R.	Wilson	(eds.),	The	Politics	of	 Islamic	Finance	 (Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	
2004),	17-36.	
70		 M.Q.	 Zaman,	 The	 Ulama	 in	 Contemporary	 Islam:	 Custodians	 of	 Change	 (Princeton,	 NJ:	 Princeton	
University	Press,	2002).	
71		 T.J.	Al-Alwani,	Ijtihād	(Herndon,	VA:	International	Institute	of	Islamic	Thought,	1993).	
72		 Ibn	Qayyim	al-Jawziyya,	supra	note	57.	
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Islamic	law	stagnated.	Partly	because	of	this	close-mindedness,	society	has	been	unable	
to	grasp	its	situation	in	a	rapidly	changing	environment.	It	has	made	Muslim	society	delay	
in	 establishing	 institutions	 that	 might	 protect	 property	 rights	 and	 foster	 good	
governance,	and	it	has	contributed	to	Muslim	countries,	with	little	power	to	control	their	
own	destiny,	being	subjugated	either	by	colonial	masters	or	by	indigenous	dictatorships.	
A	 third	 reason,	 advanced	 by	 the	 late	 M.	 Amir	 Ali,	 attributes	 the	 decline	 in	 the	
scientific	 leadership	 of	 the	 Muslim	 world	 to	 the	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 religious	
scholars.	Ali	 termed	 it	 the	 ‘development	of	 the	dichotomy	of	sciences’,	where	scholars	
narrowly	perceive	religious	knowledge	from	the	Qur’an,	ḥadīth,	sīra	(biographical	data	
on	the	life	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad),	and	perhaps	the	history	of	Islam	as	the	only	true	
knowledge	(cilm);	disciplines	such	as	mathematics,	physics,	chemistry,	astronomy,	and	
medicine	are	disregarded	as	real	sciences,	probably	due	to	their	association	with	Western	
ideals:	
	
The	consequence	of	 such	 thinking	 is	 that	 the	most	honorable	 learning	 in	 the	
eyes	of	Muslims	is	to	become	an	cālim	(scholar)	of	the	Qur’an,	ḥadīth	and	fiqh	
(Islamic	Jurisprudence)	–	labelled	collectively	as	‘Uloom	al-Islamiyah’	or	Islamic	
sciences.	The	learning	of	natural	and	social	sciences	is	considered	a	mundane	
activity	propelled	by	greed	to	make	money	or	gain	prominent	positions.	Such	
thinking	is	against	the	teaching	of	the	Qur'an,	and	has	reduced	Muslims	…	to	the	
world’s	most	disgraced	people	due	 to	 their	backwardness,	 illiteracy,	poverty	
and	 weakness	 in	 every	 indicator	 of	 modern	 progress	 within	 the	 Islamic	
context.73		
	
The	above	demonstrates	the	confluence	of	structural	weaknesses	in	jurisprudential	
interpretation	(ijtihād)	and	highlights	the	limitations	of	the	jurists	to	guide	the	Muslim	
world	in	temporal	matters,	especially	in	economics	and	social	policy.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
The	intricate	issue	of	what	Kuran	describes	as	‘the	long	divergence’	of	the	Muslim	world	
is	principally	a	consequence	of	the	jurists’	lack	of	understanding	of	the	economic	aspect	
of	 injunctions	 like	 that	 of	 ribā.74	This	 deficiency	 in	 understanding	 a	 crucial	 economic	
injunction	has	led	the	Arab	world	to	give	in	–	without	resistance	–	to	autocratic	rule	for	
centuries,	to	eschew	the	development	of	an	independent	judiciary	to	protect	the	property	
rights	of	the	masses,	and	to	overlook	the	development	of	institutions	for	their	economic	
advancement.		
First,	the	protracted	presence	of	autocratic	rule	in	the	form	of	monarchy	(although	
censured	in	the	Qur’an	as	well	as	in	the	Sunna)	has	advanced	the	economic	interests	of	a	
narrow	 elite	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 majority.75 	Throughout	 Muslim	 history,	 countless	
                                               
73		 M.A.	 Ali,	Removing	 the	 Dichotomy	 of	 Sciences:	 The	 Integration	 of	 Islamic	 Sciences	 with	 Natural	
Sciences:	A	Necessity	for	the	Growth	of	the	Muslims	(Chicago,	IL:	Institute	of	Islamic	Information	and	
Education,	2002),	1-2.	
74		 Kuran,	Long	Divergence,	supra	note	18.	
75		 The	Qur’an	(27:	34)	quotes	the	Queen	of	Sheba	(Bilqīs)	as	saying,	‘Kings,	when	they	enter	a	country,	
despoil	 it,	and	make	 the	noblest	of	 its	people	its	meanest’.	The	Sunna,	on	 the	other	hand,	predicts	
‘distressful’	conditions	of	Muslims	at	the	hands	of	monarchs.	See	J.	Robson	(trans.),	Mishkāt	al-Maṣābīḥ	
(Lahore:	S.M.	Ashraf,	1981),	bk	17,	‘The	Office	of	Commander	and	Qāḍi’.	
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highly	 influential	 jurists	 have	 legitimised	 monarchs	 and	 autocrats’	 expropriating	
wealth.76	This	contrasts	with	the	vital	check	many	early	Islamic	jurists	provided	on	rulers’	
power.77	Over	time,	however,	due	to	reforms,	the	ruling	class	has	integrated	the	jurists	
into	 its	 regimes,	 allowing	 unbridled	 and	 unchecked	 executive	 power	 to	 be	 the	 norm.	
Henceforth,	 Islamic	law	has	been	 less	of	a	 force	 for	legitimate	rule	and	has	specialised	
more	 in	 family	 and	 civil	 matters.78 	This	modus	 vivendi	 between	 the	 two	 classes	 has	
helped	legitimise	the	ruling	classes’	monopoly	over	wealth	and	has	helped	them	to	extract	
further	economic	surplus	from	their	citizens.	In	short,	the	jurists	have	dutifully	supported	
the	diverse	policies	of	the	ruling	elites,	even	when	those	elites	have	lacked	a	legal	basis	
for	such	policies.	
In	 addition	 to	 expropriating	 wealth,	 various	 monarchs	 and	 autocrats	 have	 also	
endeavoured	 to	weaken	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 deter	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	 autonomous	
social	group.	Malik	and	Awadallah	elaborate:	
	
A	singular	failure	of	the	Arab	world	is	that	it	has	been	unsuccessful	in	developing	
a	vibrant	private	sector	that	survives	without	state	crutches,	is	connected	with	
global	markets,	and	generates	productive	employment	for	its	young	…	.	With	few	
exceptions,	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 generally	 weak	 and	 dependent	 on	 state	
patronage;	success	in	it	is	determined	more	on	patronage	than	entrepreneurship.	
With	 the	 public	 sector	 acting	 as	 the	main	 avenue	 for	 job	 creation,	 the	 region	
suffers	 from	a	precarious	employment	 strategy	and	 is	 left	unprepared	 to	deal	
with	demographic	pressures.79	
	
Thus	 jurists	 at	 various	 points	 in	 history	 have	 supported	 the	 ruling	 elite	 by	
condoning	 their	 tyrannical	 behaviour	 and	 by	 failing	 to	 censure	 unjust	 laws.	 The	
apparently	narrow	interpretation	of	the	ḥadīth	as	commanding	Muslims	to	obey	rulers	
‘as	long	as	they	pray’	fails	to	grasp	the	ḥadīth’s	deeper	meaning,	which	broadly	implies	
the	observance	of	Islamic	law	(in	spirit	as	well	as	in	the	letter)	and	which	includes	the	
upholding	of	property	rights.80	
Second,	in	most	Muslim	countries,	the	judiciary	is	dysfunctional	and	instrumental	
for	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 the	 government.81	In	 early	 Islam,	 there	 is	 a	 precedent	 for	
separating	the	judiciary	from	the	government,	as	in	the	case	of	the	second	successor	of	
prophet	Muhammad,	cUmar	ibn	al-Khaṭṭāb	(r.	634-644),	who	appointed	cUbāda	ibn	Ṣāmit	
as	a	judge	and	preacher	of	Syria	to	ensure	that	just	and	proper	governance	was	upheld.82	
Third,	 in	 terms	 of	 modern	 economies,	 financial	 innovations,	 which	 give	 rise	 to	
efficient	organisational	forms	that	deliver	goods	to	their	customers	at	competitive	rates,	
have	 failed	 to	 keep	 pace	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world.	 This	 failure	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 not	
undertaking	 a	 dynamic	 jurisprudential	 interpretation	 (ijtihād),	 with	 profound	
ramifications.	It	has	impacted	on	the	competitiveness	of	Muslim	entrepreneurship	and	
has	 led	to	a	 failure	to	establish	 financial	institutions	that	might	promote	the	economic	
interests	of	the	poor	and	underprivileged,	as	encouraged	in	the	Qur'an.83	
                                               
76		 Coşgel,	Miceli	&	Ahmed,	supra	note	8.	
77		 N.	Feldman,	The	Fall	and	Rise	of	the	Islamic	State	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009).	
78		 Ibid.	
79		 Malik	&	Awadallah,	supra	note	14	at	296.	
80		 Siddiqui,	supra	note	39	at	ḥadīth	4569.	
81		 B.	Daragahi,	‘Against	the	law’,	Financial	Times,	November	1,	2013,	11.	
82		 Siddiqui,	supra	note	39	at	fn.	2028,	ḥadīth	3852.	
83		 See	Q	(30:	39).	
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These	three	issues	have	led	to	‘poverty	traps’	emanating	from	a	sequence	of	Pareto-
inferior	 equilibria	 that	 have	 been	 devastating	 for	 the	Muslim	world.	For	 example,	 the	
economic	 and	 intellectual	 decline,	 along	with	 a	 repressed	majority,	made	 the	Muslim	
countries	vulnerable	to	colonisation	by	European	countries.	The	economic	wedge	of	the	
colonies	widened	partly	due	to	‘institutional	reversal’	by	the	colonial	masters.84	That	is,	
the	 institutions	 created	 by	 the	 colonial	 masters	 were	 designed	 to	 protect	 their	 self-
interest	whilst	disregarding	the	people	of	the	land.	
The	status	of	 the	Muslim	world	has	still	not	 improved,	even	following	the	end	of	
colonial	rule,	as	Waywell	explains:	
	
Overall,	 colonialism	not	 only	 hindered	modernization	 efforts	 through	military	
and	 commercial	 domination,	 but	 also	 encouraged	 autocratic	 tendencies	 by	
repressing	the	liberties	of	the	people	and	limiting	the	expression	of	opposition	to	
the	government,’	as	long	as	‘they	do	not	interfere	with	the	goals	of	government	
policy	...	.	Overall,	this	indifference	creates	an	impression	that	to	the	West,	human	
rights	simply	do	not	matter	in	the	Muslim	world.85	
	
Thus	we	attribute	‘the	long	divergence’	to	the	retrogressive	outlook	of	the	jurists,	
their	 flawed	 interpretation	 (ijtihād),	 and	 their	 co-option	 by	 the	 ruling	 elite.	 Given	 the	
above,	 will	 a	 real	 Islamic	 financial	 architecture	 (accompanied	 by	 political	 reforms)	
reverse	 centuries	 of	 underdevelopment	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world?	 Our	 response	 to	 this,	
described	 below,	 draws	 from	 the	 ‘development’,	 ‘institutional’	 and	 ‘sociological’	
perspectives.	
One,	it	is	mandatory	to	have	an	information	architecture	in	which	property	rights	
and	foreclosure	procedures	needed	for	assets	to	serve	as	a	collateral,	along	with	accurate	
methods	of	valuing	the	underlying	assets,	are	well	established.86	This	issue	goes	beyond	
the	mere	titling	of	assets.	It	must	be	followed	by	a	number	of	politically	challenging	steps.	
For	instance,	it	should	incorporate	improving	the	efficiency	of	judicial	systems,	rewriting	
bankruptcy	codes,	and	restructuring	financial	market	regulations.87	
Empirical	studies	show	a	 link	between	a	 strong	 legal	 system	and	high	 corporate	
valuations,	corporate	finance,	and	the	efficiency	of	capital	allocations.88	That	is,	countries	
with	 laws	 that	more	effectively	protect	 investors	 tend	 to	encourage	 shareholders	and	
creditors	 to	 invest	 in	 firms,	 thereby	 driving	 up	 the	 price	 of	 corporate	 securities	 and	
decreasing	the	cost	of	capital.	
Second,	 financial	 innovations	 should	 yield	 organisational	 forms	 that	 efficiently	
support	the	delivery	of	the	products	that	their	customers	demand	at	the	lowest	price	by	
                                               
84		 Acemoglu,	Johnson	and	Robinson,	supra	note	2.	
85		 Waywell	illustrates	his	assertions	with	the	following	examples:	Libya’s	representation	on	the	United	
Nations	Human	Rights	Commission	despite	its	notoriety	for	human	rights	violation;	the	United	States’s	
funding	 Afghani	 fundamentalists	 during	 the	 Cold	War;	 and	 disregard	 for	 human	 rights	 abuses	 in	
American	allied	states	(e.g.,	Egypt,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Turkey).	Waywell,	supra	note	1	at	178	and	184.	
86		 R.	Levine,	N.	Loayza	&	T.	Beck,	‘Financial	intermediation	and	growth:	Causality	and	causes’,	Journal	of	
Monetary	Economics	46	(2000):	31-77.	
87		 N.	Bose,	A.P.	Murshid	&	M.A.	Wurm,	‘The	growth	effects	of	property	rights:	The	role	of	finance’,	World	
Development	40	(2012):	1784-1797.	
88		 R.	Levine,	‘Law,	endowments	and	property	rights’,	The	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives	19	(2005):	
61-88.	
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mitigating	transaction	costs.89	This	result	is	aligned	with	Miller’s	seminal	paper,	which	
connects	 organisational	 forms	 with	 their	 underlying	 capital	 structure. 90 	These	
preconditions	would	foster	the	development	of	efficient	financial	instruments,	markets,	
and	institutions.	For	this	condition	to	be	satisfied,	the	Muslim	world	needs	to	promote	
political	institutions	that	impose	checks	and	balances	on	those	holding	political	authority,	
bestow	political	power	on	a	broad	group	with	significant	investment	opportunities,	and	
limit	 the	 power	 holder’s	 ability	 to	 extricate	 economic	 surplus	 from	 the	 remaining	
members	of	society.	
Third,	a	development	strategy	for	the	Muslim	world	that	dissociates	the	indigenous	
culture	 (i.e.,	 religious,	 moral,	 and	 ethical	 values)	 is	 bound	 to	 end	 in	 frustration.	 In	
contrast,	a	strategy	with	a	proper	understanding	of	the	Islamic	Weltanschauung,	one	that	
appropriates	a	clear	appreciation	of	the	objectives	of	Islamic	law	and	consideration	for	
Muslim	culture,	may	have	a	greater	chance	of	success	in	the	overall	advancement	of	these	
countries.	 Furthermore,	 a	 policy	 leading	 to	 political	 reforms	 and	 the	 restoration	 of	
genuine	democracy	may	ultimately	empower	human	resources	(including	women)	and	
improve	the	environment	for	the	open	and	honest	exchange	of	ideas,	scientific	research,	
and	the	reconstituting	of	jurisprudential	interpretation	(ijtihād).	
	
	
5	 	
	
The	Arab	Spring,	which	began	in	earnest	in	early	2011,	is	currently	stalled.	Those	Middle	
Eastern	 countries	 that	 have	 witnessed	 revolutions	 still	 face	 huge	 impediments	 to	
establishing	a	civil	society:	Islamists	are	unaware	of	the	institutional	weaknesses	of	the	
jurists	 (Tunisia),	 military	 establishments	 persist	 (Egypt	 and	 Yemen),	 rival	 militias	
continue	to	battle	for	power	(Libya),	and		ISIS/ISIL	has	emerged	(Iraq	and	Syria),	with	its	
implications	both	for	neighbouring	states	and	for	Europe.	
The	path	to	establishing	a	civil	society	for	the	Arab	and	Muslim	world	will	inevitably	
contain	 hurdles.	 An	 intellectual	 infrastructure	must	 be	 established	 first	 and	 foremost.	
This	 is	 because	 intellectual	 dynamism	 has	 atrophied	 and	 has	 left	 the	 Muslim	 world	
vulnerable	 to	 fundamentalisms,	 extremisms,	 and	 other	modes	 of	 retrograde	 thinking.	
This	paper	has	established	the	error	of	the	intellectual	stagnation	that	has	beleaguered	
Islamic	jurists.	It	has	critiqued	modern	Islamic	banking	for	having	evolved	into	a	model	
far	from	the	Islamic	ideal.	Yet,	far	from	seeking	to	deride	the	religious	establishment,	the	
aim	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 articulate	 the	 point	 that	 their	 retrogressive	 and	 reductionist	
outlook	in	the	domain	of	economics	and	sociology	has	significantly	impeded	development	
in	the	Muslim	world.	
The	Muslim	world	is	perhaps	in	denial	regarding	the	gravity	of	the	situation	it	faces;	
it	 has,	 after	 all,	 yet	 to	 shape	 sound	 economic	 policies	 or	 lay	 the	 groundwork	 for	
institutions	that	might	stimulate	economic	growth.	This	is	why	studies	that	demonstrate	
a	causal	link	between	Islamic	beliefs,	behavioural	outcomes,	and	economic	performance	
are	 at	 best	 speculative.	 This	 paper	 also	 reconciles	 the	 two	 views	 in	 the	 literature	 on	
whether	 Islam	is	an	 impediment	or	a	 facilitator	of	economic	development	and	thus,	of	
growth.	We	absolve	Islamic	law	from	holding	back	the	progress	of	Muslims.	
If	the	Muslim	world	is	to	make	any	headway	out	of	its	current	morass,	Islamic	jurists	
must	 adopt	 a	 new	 approach,	 because	 for	 centuries	 they	 have	 been	 the	 de	 facto	
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formulators	 of	 correct	 practice	 in	 Islam.	 They	must	 reformulate	 how	 they	 undertake	
jurisprudential	 interpretation	 (ijtihād)	 in	 Islamic	 law	 and	 must	 also	 reform	 their	
educational	institutions,	which	perpetuate	a	retrogressive	outlook.	As	they	restructure	
their	educational	institutions,	they	must:	exchange	ideas	between	the	various	legal	and	
theological	schools,	without	sectarian	bias;	 include	the	social	sciences	and	humanities;	
promote	 creativity	 and	 a	 clear	 position	 against	 uncritical	 acceptance	 of	 medieval	
jurisprudence;	and	separate	normative	Islam	from	historical	Islam.	
Our	central	finding	is	that	jurists,	by	entering	a	technical	field	without	seeking	the	
guidance	of	experts,	as	entreated	in	the	Qur'an	(16:43),	risk	jeopardising	the	economic	
foundation	and	thus	the	very	survival	of	the	Muslim	world.92	Furthermore,	failing	to	seek	
guidance	violates	the	objectives	(maqāṣid)	of	Sharīca,	which	the	jurists	are	tasked	with	
safeguarding.	 Rather	 than	 making	 unilateral	 decisions,	 jurists	 should	 conduct	 a	 joint	
jurisprudential	interpretation	(ijtihād)	by	working	with	financial	economists	to:	develop	
institutions	 that	 enforce	 contracts,	 thus	 promoting	 property	 rights;	 foster	 good	
governance	and	provide	a	conducive	environment	for	private	initiative;	and	structure	a	
financial	infrastructure	that	promotes	growth.	
                                               
92		 See	Q	(16:	43).	
